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2Abstract
It is well known that modern production processes usually involve a large
number of sub-contractors who each specialize in producing particular com-
ponents that together form the final good. The efficiency afforded by the
specialization, however, also incurs additional uncertainty in the production
process, since each firm in the subcontract chain can fail to produce the com-
ponent it is responsible for and jeopardize the entire production process. I
construct a simulation model in which firms arranged on a network optimize
their subcontracting decisions based on the local information available to
them about their neighboring firms’ reputations.
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Introduction
Subcontracting is ubiquitous in modern global supply chains. For example,
Airbus has 1500 contractors in 30 countries that provide them with the 4
million components that are required in the manufacture of an Airbus A380
(Airbus, 2012). Dell similarly uses more than 130 suppliers from 17 countries
(Dell, 2012). Neither is subcontracting limited to the manufacturing sector.
International outsourcing in the service industry has been growing since the
1990’s. Industry surveys indicate that in 2011, 43% of US companies in the
information technology services sector and 38% of those in the research and
development sector outsourced some of their production processes interna-
tionally (SourcingLine, 2012).
Although the potential avenues for subcontracting have been greatly ex-
panded by technological innovations such as those in information technology
in the recent decades, it is not a recent phenomenon. The success of Japanese
manufacturing in the Post-War years, especially of automakers such as Toy-
7ota, has been attributed to their innovative use of flexible networks of sub-
contractors (Womack et al., 2007; Shimokawa, 2010). Even as far back as
the eighteenth century, networks of subcontractors have been documented in
the manufacturing processes of French paper makers (Reynard, 1998).
At the core of modern economic theory is the idea of diminishing returns,
and of the gains resulting from specialization and division of labor. Thus
we expect countries, firms, and individuals to specialize in certain techniques
or the production of certain goods, and exchange goods and services with
others in a market setting in order to allow for a more efficient utilization of
resources. Subcontracting is one of the ways in which this specialization and
division of labor can occur, specifically, if firms specialize in certain stages of a
multi-stage production process of a single good. The efficiency gains afforded
by subcontracting, however, have to be weighed against the transaction costs
that could potentially be incurred during the market exchanges. This insight
was first explained by Ronald Coase in his essay, “The Nature of the Firm”
(Coase, 1937).
This paper expands on a theoretical model by Kikuchi et al. (2012) which
formalizes Coase’s argument about transactions costs, asking the question,
“what is the optimal amount of subcontracting that should take place given
the trade-off between gains from specialization and losses from transaction
costs?” I present a dynamic model consisting of a network of firms that col-
laboratively produce one unit of a good in each round by subcontracting to
one another. In this model, transaction costs arise from the uncertainty as-
sociated with whether or not a subcontractor will deliver the finished goods.
8In each round there is only a probability θ that the subcontractor will suc-
cessfully deliver the goods, and firms have to factor in this uncertainty before
deciding to subcontract to another firm. I solve the model computationally
to reproduce the stylised facts observed in the model by Kikuchi et al. (2012),
which are the following: the amount of subcontracting declines with increas-
ing uncertainty; the downstream firms produce a larger proportion of the
final good than the upstream firms; and the downstream firms have a higher
value-added to the final good.
After that, I extend my model to an imperfect information setting, in
which firms do not have objective knowledge about the uncertainty associated
with subcontracting to other firms. Instead, each firm observes successes
and failures from prior rounds of subcontracting to other firms, and use
this information to update its beliefs about the uncertainty associated with
these other firms. In other words, each firm assigns a reputation to all the
other firms that it can subcontract to, and learns from experience about
whether or not their subcontractors are reputable. The firms then factor in
the other firms’ reputation in deciding how much and to whom they should
subcontract.
The results show that when reputation updating is involved, certain firms
can dominate the production process, receiving the lion’s share of the subcon-
tracts. This happens even in a network of identical firms where each has the
same uncertainty. Furthermore, the model shows that firms that are more
interconnected with one another are more likely to dominate the subcontract-
ing process. This suggests that the availability of potential subcontractors is
9one of the reasons for economies of agglomeration.
Networks and Agglomeration
Subcontracting requires that firms are interconnected with other firms. Hence,
opportunities for subcontracting are most abundant in situations where ei-
ther firms are in geographical proximity, or are closely knit together in social
and professional networks. Transaction costs are a catch-all term that include
transportation costs, search costs, and costs due to uncertainty. These costs
are lowered when firms either locate near each other, or when they can com-
municate more effectively with one another. When a client can communicate
with its subcontractor to make sure the goods are of adequate quality, and are
delivered on time, this facilitates an increased usage of subcontracting. Ease
of communication with subcontractors also enables flexibility. Last minute
changes in the design of the product, or the quantity of goods ordered, can
be more easily accommodated when the client can better communicate with
it’s subcontractor. An article in the Atlantic Monthly magazine from 2007
describes how the availability of a vast network of diverse subcontractors in
Chinese manufacturing hubs such as the Pearl River Delta allows for this
flexibility (Fallows, 2007):
You have announced a major new product, which has gotten great
buzz in the press. But close to release time, you discover a design
problem that must be fixed—and no U.S. factory can adjust its
production process in time.
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The Chinese factories can respond more quickly, and not sim-
ply because of 12-hour workdays. “Anyplace else, you’d have to
import different raw materials and components,” Casey told me.
“Here, you’ve got nine different suppliers within a mile, and they
can bring a sample over that afternoon. People think China is
cheap, but really, it’s fast.”
This anecdotal evidence will be supported by a review of thorough em-
pirical research in the next section. Nevertheless, the economic intuition is
that, the more potential subcontractors are available, the more a client can
spread the risk associated with subcontracting. Thus, the degree of intercon-
nectedness in a network of firms increases the likelihood of subcontracting.
In other words, an economy in which firms are more connected to other firms
has the upper hand in subcontracting. The results from the model presented
in this paper show this to be true.
Consider an economy with two regions such as in Fig. 1.1. It consists of
Region A, in which all firms are connected to one another, and Region B,
where each firm is only connected to two other firms. The two regions have
the same number of identical firms, where each of those firms have the same
uncertainty in delivering the finished goods (i.e. the same probability θ that
they will successfully deliver the finished good after being subcontracted to).
Thus, each region can divide a production process into six different steps,
with each firm producing one step. When firms have objective knowledge
about the uncertainty associated with each firm, the expected cost of the
11
finished product would be the same in both regions. However, when firms
gradually learn about the other firms in their region by updating their rep-
utations from past experience, a different outcome is obtained. It turns out
that firms in Region A can produce the good at a lower expected cost than
those in Region B. The reason being that firms in Region A have more choices
in whom they can subcontract to. If a string of bad outcomes ruins the rep-
utation of a subcontractor in Region A, there are other subcontractors that
are available, whereas in Region B, a tarnished reputation for one subcon-
tractor may induce a firm to forgo subcontracting and thus reap lesser gains
from the division of labor.
One way to interpret this result is that the region in which firms are
more interconnected due to geographical proximity can out-compete regions
in which firms are less interconnected. As explained in the precious example
where the firms were identical in both regions, this can happen even without
a necessarily more efficient production process. This offers an additional
reason for the positive spillovers that result from agglomeration.
The next section reviews that theoretical and empirical literature on sub-
contracting, agglomeration, networks, and reputation. Chapter 2 describes
the theoretical framework of the baseline model with perfect information
and derives the analytical and computational results. Chapter 3 allows for
imperfect information and adds the mechanism of reputation updates and
concludes. It shows the computational results in models with complete net-
works with imperfect information and subsequently compares how complete
and incomplete networks differ in situations with imperfect information.
12
Figure 1.1: Two regions with interconnected firms. Region A shows a com-
plete network where all firms are connected to one another. Region B shows




Ever since Adam Smith wrote in the Wealth of Nations about the divi-
sion of labor in a pin factory (Smith, 1776), the benefits of specialization
has been part of economic theory. As mentioned in the introduction, this
paper belongs to the strand of the literature that deals with the tradeoffs be-
tween gains from specialization and losses incurred through transaction costs.
The literature on transaction costs begins with Coase’s aforementioned essay
(Coase, 1937). In it, he argues that the reason why market economies do
not produce goods by simply subcontracting everything out to individuals
and letting the price mechanism decide the optimal allocation of resources, is
that every single transaction carried out via the market involves transaction
costs. These transaction costs come in the form of search costs, bargaining
costs, costs due to uncertainty, and the costs of enforcing contracts. Hence
the need for islands of command economies, or firms, to exist within a mar-
ket economy, since transactions within each firm do not have to incur these
transaction costs. The flip side of the argument, then, is that if organizing
production within a single firm can mitigate transaction costs, why does the
economy not consist of a single giant firm? The answer, Coase argues, is that
there are “decreasing returns to the entrepreneur function”, or “diminishing
returns to management”. That is, large organizations become unwieldy to
manage, and the decision making apparatus of a single organization cannot
match the efficiency of the decentralized market in which resources are allo-
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cated via the price mechanism. Hence, Coase argues that there is an optimal
size of firms where they are only big enough such that at the margin, the
increase in costs due to diminishing returns of management is equal to the
increase in costs incurred in the form of the transaction costs of a market
exchange.
Following Coase, Oliver Williamson has been one of the main figures in
the field of transaction costs economics. In a series of papers that are col-
lected in the book Economic Organization (Williamson, 1986), he presents
formal models that incorporate Coase’s insights and also elaborates on the
ways in which transaction costs occur in economies. One of them introduces
a hierarchically organized structure of the firm where the workers at the
lowest level, who supply the labor that goes into the production of goods,
are supervised by managers one level up in the hierarchy, who in turn are
supervised by managers who are an additional level up the hierarchy, and
so on (Williamson, 1967). He shows that the optimal number of hierarchies,
n∗, is dependent on several factors. For example, n∗ increases as the span
of control, i.e. the number of employees a supervisor can handle effectively,
increases. Also, n∗ increases as the degree of compliance to supervisor objec-
tives increases. In another paper (Williamson, 1971), he argues that vertical
integration of firms take place to mitigate the transaction costs ensuing from
bargaining between upstream firms and downstream firms, contractual in-
completeness, moral hazard, costs incurred when gathering and processing
information, and institutional characteristics such as the level of trust. He
conjectures that “vertical integration would be more complete in a low-trust
15
than a high trust culture”, which supports the results obtained in my model.
The paper on subcontracting by Kikuchi et al. (2012) is largely based on
the formalization of the ideas by Coase and Williamson. In their paper, firms
in a supply chain collaborate to produce one unit of a final good. This collab-
oration process starts off when an initial firm decides between 1) producing a
certain portion of the final good in-house whilst facing diminishing marginal
returns, in accordance with Coase’s idea of diminishing returns to manage-
ment; and 2) subcontracting the portion that was not produced in-house
to a another firm. This subcontracting averts the costs due to diminishing
returns to management but instead incurs transaction costs associated with
market exchange. As firms recursively repeat this process of subcontracting,
transaction costs are compounded as the number of firms in the supply chain
grows. As such, the firms in the supply chain face an optimization problem
in which they decide the best trade-off between diminishing marginal returns
to in-house production and the increasing transaction costs as the more firms
are added to the supply chain. Chapter 2 discusses Kikuchi et al.’s (2012)
model in more detail, while Chapter 3 extends this model to a setting where
firms do not know, ex-ante, the transaction costs that they will be facing
when they choose to subcontract. In this setting, the firms rely on their past
experience with various potential subcontractors to form expectations about
the transaction costs involved in subcontracting.
This paper also differs from Kikuchi et al. (2012) in its methodology
and the economic phenomenon that it seeks to explain. Firstly, in terms of
methodology, Kikuchi et al. (2012) derives analytical proofs for their main
16
results relying on Tarski’s fixed point theorem and other methods from func-
tional analysis. My methodology in this paper relies on computational sim-
ulations on an exogenously determined network of a finite fixed number of
firms. Secondly, in terms of the economic phenomenon that is explained,
Kikuchi et al.’s (2012) aim is mainly to formalize Coase’s intuitive argu-
ments, whereas my paper seeks to uncover a possible reason for agglomera-
tion economies in networks of subcontractors. Sections 1.1.2 and 1.1.3 review
the literature on agglomeration and the economics of networks respectively.
Hart and Moore (1990) also contributed to the literature on the theory of
the firm with a model that formalizes Coase’s insights. In the vein of Kikuchi
et al. (2012), their paper also analyses the reasons why a firm would choose
to carry out its production either in-house or through contracting to another
firm. However, their approach to the problem is based on the allocation of
property rights to the various parties. They argue that a firm in possession of
an asset that is required in the production process will have more bargaining
power over the labor that is needed for the production, whereas if the firm did
not own the productive asset but instead contracted out the work to another
firm that did, it will have less bargaining power over labor. In a dynamic
setting where agents who can sell their labor make ex-ante investments in
human capital, they would choose to invest differently depending on how the
property rights are allocated. The authors give an example in which a yacht’s
skipper and a chef jointly provide a service to a rich client. If the chef could
invest in human capital to increase his productivity, he would choose to make
the said investment if the yacht was owned by the rich client, but he would
17
not make the investment if the skipper owned the yacht. The reason for this
is because in the first scenario, the chef needs both the client and the skipper
to produce and sell his good and thus, in a symmetric bargaining outcome
he has to share two thirds of his earnings with the skipper and the client.
In the second scenario, however, since the yacht’s skipper does not own the
essential asset and thus does not have bargaining power, the chef will only
have to share half his earnings with the client under symmetric bargaining.
This means that he has a higher incentive to invest in human capital. From
this brief outline, it can be seen that the motivation of their paper is different
from that of Kikuchi et al. (2012) and this current paper, since our models
do not rely on property rights or assume any explicit role for capital in the
productive process.
Outside of economics, the field of operations research also has a large the-
oretical literature on subcontracting and supply chain management (Chopra
and Meindl, 2007). These models often feature explicitly modelled networks
of manufacturers, suppliers and retailers (Nagurney, 2006). They also feature
computational simulation models such as those that use multi-agent systems,
which are autonomous software agents which act as decision makers in the
supply chain, often incorporating artificial intelligence techniques (Chaib-
Draa and Mu¨ller, 2011). The approach differs from that of economists, how-
ever, in that the supply chain is already taken as exogenously determined,
and the models focus only on deriving the optimal behaviour of firms within
it, whereas economists seek to explain why production is organized in a multi-
level supply chain in the first place.
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In terms of the empirical literature on subcontracting, we will briefly
examine Banerjee and Duflo’s (2000) study of contracting in the software in-
dustry in India, and Arzaghi and Henderson’s (2008) study of subcontracting
in the advertising agency industry in Manhattan.
Banerjee and Duflo (2000) use data from interviews with 125 CEOs of
Indian software firms and examined the extent to which reputation played a
role in contracting in the software industry. They found that firms which have
better proxies for reputation - such as having been established for a longer
time, are ISO certified, or are subsidiaries of foreign companies - have to bear
less of the overrun costs. These are costs which are ex ante unaccounted for
when the contract is signed but are incurred by the contractor during the
production process and are split between the client and contractor in ex
post negotiation. For example, an overrun cost may be incurred when the
contractor estimated that a project will only take 3 months but ended up
taking 5 months instead, therefore the ex ante contract does not account the
costs of the additional 2 months. The authors’ interpretation is that, the
more the client bears the overrun costs, the more reputable the contractor
is. They also find that most clients rely on long established relations with
contractors, this corroborates with the results of my model.
Arzaghi and Henderson (2008) use data from individual advertising agen-
cies in lower Manhattan to measure the benefits of being located in an area
with a cluster of other agencies. These clusters consist of firms specializing
in different aspects of advertising and regularly subcontract to one another.
They found the benefits to profitability of locating in a cluster was signifi-
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cant. These scale effects decrease rapidly with distance and are gone if a firm
is located more than 750 metres away from a cluster. The authors describe
an example of the process by which subcontracting occurs and the benefits
accrued from locating in an area which has a cluster of similar firms:
The executives said that their main goals in contacts are to sup-
plement their limited in-house capacity, in terms of gathering
both ideas in preparing proposals and sufficient materials and
labour to fulfil a particular contract. As a simple example of the
latter, agency A received work to redesign a set of presentation
slides for a client. The people in agency A worked on the set
of slides for a week and presented a sample to the client. The
client was happy with the sample. Then the agency learnt that
the work involved not only the 100 pages in the set of slides dis-
cussed in the initial meeting, but also that there were 10 other
similar cases that needed to be done in about 10 days. This was
beyond the capacity of the agency. To help keep the account, the
head of the agency A utilized a contact in agency B he trusted
could help with the job. That contact was currently two blocks
away. They have been involved in a business relationship that
started 10 years earlier.
Again, both the anecdotal and the econometric evidence show that: (i)
reputation plays a large role in the assigning of subcontracts, (ii) firms sub-
contract to other firms with which they have long running relationships, and
20
(iii) locating your firm within a cluster of other firms enhances these rela-
tionships. All of this corroborates with the results of my model.
1.1.2 Agglomeration
There is a vast literature on the economies of agglomeration, that stretch
back to Marshall’s (1890) Principles of Economics, in which he argues that
economies of agglomeration can arise from lower transport costs, lower labor
costs due to labor pooling effects, and information spillovers. A recent paper
by Ellison et al. (2010) finds empirical evidence for all three of these effects
using data from US and UK manufacturing industries.
For the purposes of this current paper, I will only discuss the reasons
for the third of Marshall’s theories for agglomeration, that is, the informa-
tion spillover effects. Specifically relating to my model is the agglomera-
tion economies arising from the ease of subcontracting. Duranton and Puga
(2004), and Gill and Goh (2010) provide surveys of the recent literature on
agglomeration. The former argues that the theoretical literature (as of 2004)
on agglomeration due to information spillovers is not solidly based on micro-
foundations, and usually ad-hoc assumptions are made regarding the nature
of the information externality. The latter summarises the empirical literature
on spatial agglomeration effects in different industries as follows: (i) spatial
clustering is more pronounced in high-technology industries than light in-
dustries, (ii) services are more spatially concentrated than manufacturing as
service industries are more codependent, e.g. banks need advertising, ad-
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vertising firms need banks. Both of these pieces of evidence suggest that
ease of subcontracting fosters clustering, since high-tech firms tend to be
more specialized and rely more subcontracting than light industry, and firms
in service industries need to subcontract due to the multi-faceted nature of
their business, e.g. a bank cannot efficiently carry out an advertising cam-
paign in-house.
Theoretical models which seek to provide an explanation for agglomer-
ation in urban areas include Duranton and Puga (2001) and Harrigan and
Venables (2006). The former uses a general equilibrium framework to ex-
plain the co-existence of different types of clusters. Some cities have clusters
of diverse industries which fosters the development of new products and pro-
totypes, while others have clusters of specialized industries to focus on mass
production once a prototype is perfected. The latter uses a model similar to
Kremer’s (1993) O-Ring theory to explain that clustering may arise so that
the costs arising due to the time taken to wait for deliveries of intermediate
goods can be minimized.
1.1.3 Networks and Reputation
This paper uses a model that involves a network of firms and the reputations
that these firms have of each other. The techniques used here are borrowed
from the network model of labor markets by Calvo-Armengol and Jackson
(2004), and the lecture notes on Bayesian reputation updating by Cabral
(2005).
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The economics of networks has been a thriving field in recent years. A sur-
vey can be found in Jackson (2010). Recent literature include the aforemen-
tioned Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004) on labor markets, Battiston et al.
(2007) and Delli Gatti et al. (2010) on financial and credit networks, Haus-
mann and Hidalgo (2011) and Hausmann and Hidalgo (2011) on the network
structure of international trade, Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2011) on learning
in social networks, and Acemoglu et al. (2011) on how input-output linkages






The baseline model consists of a network of n firms which divide up a task
to produce one unit of a good for an external client in each round. Figure
2.1 shows an example of a network with n = 3. The client has a choice of
ordering the good from any of these 3 firms. When a firm receives an order
from the client to produce one unit of the good, it chooses to produce a
certain portion of the good in-house and is free to subcontract the remaining
portion to firms in the rest of the network. Figure 2.2 shows how an order
from the client might be processed by the firms. In this case, each firm
produces 1
3
of the product and passes it along to the next firm.
This structure can be represented linearly in order to better explain the
notation and assumptions used in the model. The entire production process
is seen as producing a unit measure of the good from [0, 1]. It is assumed
24
Figure 2.1: A complete network of 3 firms showing the client’s contracting
options.
Figure 2.2: A possible chain of subcontracts in a 3 firm network.
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. Upon getting the original order from
the client, a firm can choose to produce k1 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} parts in house,
and subcontract n − k1 parts to another firm. The parts that are produced
by the first firm (most downstream) start from 1, i.e. if k1 = 1, the first firm
produces (n−1
n
, 1], if k1 = 2, it produces (
n−2
n
, 1], if k1 = n, it produces [0, 1],
etc. The next firm in line then chooses to produce k2 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n − k1},
and subcontracts the remaining n − k1 − k2 parts to the next firm, and the
process goes on until all n parts are produced. We denote the start of the
interval that firm i produces as ui and the end of the interval that it produces
as si. Thus (u1, s2] = (
n−k1
n






A case for which n = 3 is shown in Figure 2.3, where each firm chooses
to produce 1 out of 3 parts and thus is each responsible for an interval
of measure 1
3
, i.e. k1 = k2 = k3 = 1. This is one of the many possible
paths to produce the good. The other possible paths are {k1 = 3, k2 =
0, k3 = 0}, and {k1 = 2, k2 = 1, k3 = 0}. Sections 2.1.4 and 2.3.1 discuss
the possible permutations in detail, since the computational solution to the
model evaluates the expected costs associated with all the possible paths and
chooses the optimal one.
Before looking at how to determine the optimal path to produce the
good in Section 2.1.3, the next section describes additional features of the
model which provide the trade-off between the diminishing returns to in-
house production, and the uncertainty associated with subcontracting.
26
Figure 2.3: Notation showing the number of parts produced k, the starting
point u, and the ending point s, in a possible chain of subcontracts in a 3
firm network.
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2.1.1 Exogenous network and free entry
The network structure determines how each firm is connected to all the other
firms and is given exogenously. A firm can only subcontract to the other firms
that it is connected to. Also, it can only subcontract to firms that have not
already been subcontracted to in that round. For instance, firm i, upon
getting a subcontract from firm i − 1, can in turn choose to subcontract to
any firm in the set {i+ 1, i+ 2, . . . , n} that it is connected to in the network.
All the connections are bilateral. So, a firm i can subcontract to a firm j and
vice versa as long as they are connected in the network.
Figure 2.4 shows some examples of networks. In Figure 2.4a, every firm is
potentially able to subcontract to every other firm, this is called a complete
network. In Figure 2.4b, some firms such as the ones labeled 3 and 4 at the
top, cannot subcontract to each other. In Figure 2.4c, the firms are seper-
ated into two sub-networks, where the firms from one sub-network cannot
subcontract to the firms in the other. These latter two are called incomplete
networks.
We now look at the economic interpretation behind the network. Each
firm in the network can be thought of as a location, in which a competitive
market of identical potential entrants exist. We assume that there are no
barriers to entry. Thus, in each round, a firm will occupy each location and
take part in the production, making an expected profit of zero.
28
(a) A complete network with n = 7 firms
(b) An incomplete network with n = 7 firms
(c) An incomplete network with n = 10 firms. Divided into a 2 sub-networks
Figure 2.4: Examples of networks of firms.
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A possible interpretation is that each firm on the network occupies a lo-
cation in a city, which is represented by the network. Some locations are
connected to others, whereas some are not. The “connections” can be inter-
preted liberally, either as physical transportation links, or as interpersonal
contacts between entrepreneurs living in different neighbourhoods.
The scale of the network can also be interpreted in different ways. In-
stead of the firms being located in different neighborhoods and the network
representing a city, the firms might represent individual cities in a network of
cities. Another scale at which the model can also be seen is one where firms
that represent individual countries are connected together in an international
trade network.
Each firm has the resources to produce the entire unit measure of the
good, or it can produce any number of parts as explained above. However,
since the resources available to the firm in each location is limited, each
firm faces diminishing returns in the form of a twice differentiable, convex
production function c(x), with c′(x) > 0 and c′′(x) > 0. In the computational
solution to the model, we assume c(x) = x2. Hence, there is an incentive
for the firm to subcontract to other firms, i.e. only produce a portion of the
good in-house and buy the rest from another firm, in order to reduce costs.
2.1.2 Uncertainty and the production process
Whenever a firm (contractee) subcontracts to another firm, there is a prob-
ability θ that the subcontractor will successfully deliver the finished goods,
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and therefore a 1−θ chance of failure. We assume that all the firms have the
same probability of success. Therefore θ is a constant across all firms and in
every round. It is also assumed that all firms know the true θ of every other
firm on the network. This latter assumption of perfect information will be
relaxed in the extended model in Chapter 3.
Note also, as explained earlier, that each firm is one amongst many of the
potential entrants which may occupy a particular location in the network.
Hence, the θ can be thought of as location specific, and not firm specific.
This can be interpreted as different firms within the same neighborhood all
having the same uncertainty.
The uncertainty due to θ can be interpreted as arising from multiple
possible sources. It could be the firm’s fault that the goods manufactured are
not up to standard, it could factors such as corruption or bad transportation
which prevents the finished goods from being delivered successfully.
This uncertainty creates a limit to the extent that firms should optimally
subcontract, since every additional level of subcontracting compounds the
probability of failure. The optimal amount of subcontracting trades off the
diminishing returns of in-house production to the diminishing returns of ad-
ditional subcontracting costs accrued due to uncertainty.
Additional details of the process need to be examined before presenting
the firms’ profit maximization problem. It it important to consider what
happens when all the stages of production are successful and what happens
when they are not. Figure 2.5 shows how a successful production process
might take place, when n = 3 and k1 = k2 = k3 = 1. The production takes
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Figure 2.5: The steps of production and payment in a 3 stage process when
every stage is successfully carried out.
place starting from the last firm in the subcontracting chain, in this case,
firm 3. Firm 2 waits for a successful deliverly from firm 3 before making the
payment. Once firm 2 receives the goods from firm 3, it will in turn produce
its portion, and if successfully delivered to firm 1, will receive its payment. In
turn, firm 1 only starts production when it receives the intermediate goods
from firm 2, and produces its in house component, which it sends to the
client, and is subsequently paid.
Figures 2.6 and 2.7 illustrate what happens when some firm fails in the
subcontracting process. When firm 2 fails, as shown in Figure 2.6, firm 2
still has to pay firm 3 for its portion, but firm 1 incurs no costs either in
production or in having to pay its subcontractor, firm 2. Similarly the client
does not have to pay firm 1 either. As another example, consider firm 1
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Figure 2.6: The steps of production and payment in a 3 stage process when
firm 2 fails.
failing while firms 2 and 3 are successful. In this case, firm 1 still pays firm
2, and firm 2 still pays firm 3, but the client does not pay firm 1.
2.1.3 Profit maximization
Since each firm is maximizing expected profits, it will have to mark up the
price it charges its contractee so as to make up for the possibility of failure of
its in-house production, but each firm does not have to take into account the
failure of its subcontractor’s chance of failure as this will already be reflected
in the price the subcontractor charges.
Figure 2.8 shows the set-up of the problem faced by firm i in a production
process involving n firms. Firm i’s problem of maximizing expected profit
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Figure 2.7: The steps of production and payment in a 3 stage process when
firm 1 fails.
Figure 2.8: Notation for the recursive production process.
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can be stated as
E (pii) = θpi (si)− c (si − ui)− pj (ui) , (2.1)
where pi(x), with x ∈ [0, 1], is the intermediate price for the [0, x] interval
sub-portion of the final good that is charged by firm i, and c(x) is the cost
of producing a sub-portion of measure x of the good in-house. The expected
revenue firm i receives is θpi(si), factoring in its uncertainty. Its costs consists
of the in-house cost c (si − ui) and the subcontracting cost pj (ui). Since it
only has to incur costs when its subcontractor is successful, θ does not factor
into the expected costs.
Each firm i has to make the choice of the number of steps to produce, ki,
and which firm j to subcontract to. The starting point ui is determined by
ki, as ui(ki) =
si−ki
n
, and si is determined by the firm’s contractee. Since the
maximum expected profits is zero after optimization,
max
ki,j







{c (si − ui(ki)) + pj (ui(ki))} , (2.3)
which is the equilibrium price function for every intermediate portion [0, si)
of the good. Thus, (2.3) gives a recursive definition of the price function at










Since the network structure determines which firms j, the solution to the
model requires that we work out all the possible production paths available
for any given network. An analytical method of calculating the possible
production paths for a complete network is given in Section 2.1.4 and a more
general algorithmic method for any network structure is given in Section
2.3.1.
2.1.4 Possible production paths for a complete net-
work
Consider a complete network of n firms. Dividing n into its integer partitions
and taking all the permutations of the parts of each partition will give the
number of ways the n steps can be divided among n firms. For example,
when n = 3, the process can be divided into 3, 1 + 2, 2 + 1 or 1 + 1 + 1 steps.
The partitions can be translated into production quotas for each of the three
firms as follows:
• 3 means the most downstream firm produces everything, i.e. {k1 =
3, k2 = 0, k3 = 0};
• 1 + 2 means {k1 = 1, k2 = 2, k3 = 0};
• 2 + 1 means {k1 = 2, k2 = 1, k3 = 0};
• and 1 + 1 + 1 means {k1 = 1, k2 = 1, k3 = 1}.
For each permutation of the integer partition of n involving k partitions,
we have nPm ways of allocating m out of the n firms to the production
36





















Table 2.1: Number of possible production paths for complete networks with
n firms.
process. Using the n = 3 example, in the case of the partition 1 + 2, which
uses m = 2 out of the n = 3 firms, we have 3P2 = 6 allocations. We then
have




where P(n,m) is the number of integer partitions of n with m parts. Table
2.1 shows how the number of possible paths increases factorially with n.
37
In the analytical solution to the model presented in Section 2.2, we assume
that the firms are identical to one another. Hence, for any given integer
partition of the quotas for each firm in the production process, it does not
matter which particular firms are involved in the production. Thus, the
number of possible paths reduces to





2.2.1 An example solution for p(•)
This section gives an example of how to solve for the pricing function p(m
n
) for
m = 0, 1, 2, 3 in a complete network. Since all firms are identical, the client
as well as each firm along the production chain is indifferent about which
firm j it should subcontract to, and the optimization problem in (2.3) just
involves choosing ki. We can thus drop the subscripts for the p(•) function.
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We have the following values for equilibrium prices:








































































































































































































































We can observe from (2.6) to (2.9) that:
• A downstream firm will produce a larger portion of the good than an
39
upstream firm, since any production carried out upstream has higher

























, in line (2.9). Since 1
θ





























































• The value added, p(si)−p(ui), is higher for a downstream firm than for
an upstream firm. This follows from the second point, and also from
the compounding effect of the uncertainty. To illustrate, consider the
case where k1 = k2 = k3 = 1. Compare the last options in (2.7), (2.8),






















1, 2 and 3 respectively, where 3 is the furthest upstream and 1 is the
furthest downstream. This shows that the compounding effect of the
uncertainty creates a higher value added for the downstream firms than
the upstream firms.
• A higher uncertainty (smaller θ) leads the firms to subcontract less,






, etc. increase when θ decreases.
These three results are proven in the following section for a complete
network with any n ∈ N+. A more generalized version of these three results
is mentioned in Kikuchi et al. (2012). The difference between their model
and the one presented here, is that this model only allows the firms to pick
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from a discrete set of production quotas ki, whereas their model allows firms
to pick any real value for the production quota.
2.2.2 Properties of the solution






Lemma 1. For every k ∈ {1, 2, . . .m}, ∃ a set of possible sequences {xi}ki=1
where each is a sequence of positive integers such that x1 +x2 + . . .+xk = m,


















where 1 ≤ m ≤ n, and m,n ∈ N+.















































































































Hence, we have shown by induction that the Lemma 1 is true for all m ∈
{1, 2, . . . , n}.
Next, we show that any integer partition of m can be attributed to a cer-
tain sequence of possible production quotas for a production chain involving
m firms.
Lemma 2. For a complete network, any sequence {xi}ki=1 such that
∑k
i=1 xi =
m, with xi ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} is a possible division of production quotas for a
production chain involving m firms.
Proof. Let each firm i produce a quota xi
n





. Hence, {xi}ki=1 represents a feasible sequence of production
quotas for producing a fraction m
n
of the final good.
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2.2.3 Downstream firms produce more
The first theorem shows that in an optimal production chain, firms that are
more downstream produce a larger fraction of the final good.
Theorem 1. The minimizer {x?i }ki=1 for (2.10) for each k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} is
such that x?i ≥ x?j for all i < j, where i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}.
Proof. By way of contradiction, assume ∃ {x?i }ki=1 that is a minimizer for













































































































































Thus, {x?i }ki=1 cannot be a minimizer, since there exists another sequence





















by Lemma 2, {x′i}ki=1 is a feasible sequence of production quotas.
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Figure 2.9: An optimal production chain showing the four most upstream







2.2.4 Downstream firms have higher value-added
The value added by each firm in an optimal production chain increases as
we move from upstream to downstream firms.
Theorem 2. In a network with n ≥ 3 firms, where x?i
n
is the optimal quota
chosen by each firm i ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., k}, where i = 1 is the most downstream



























Proof. With reference to Figure 2.9,










































































































Hence we can show that value added is increasing as we go downstream






































































































































































































































where the first inequality is due to Theorem 1 and the second inequality is
due to the assumption above.
Since m is arbitrary, we have shown by induction that (2.12) is true.
2.2.5 More subcontracting takes place as θ increases
As the success probability θ increases, firms take advantage of the gains
from specialization and choose to subcontract more, resulting in production
chains that involve more firms. In order to show this, first we prove that
the price of the final good is decreasing with respect to θ. Next, we look at
how two production chains that are initially producing the final good at the
same price will change their prices with respect to θ. We show in Theorem 3
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that the production chain utilizes more firms will decrease its final price by
more than the the chain which utilizes less firms, given a marginal increase
in θ. Theorem 3 thus shows that it benefits firms to increase the amount of
subcontracting as θ increases.
We first show that the price function of the final good p(1) is decreasing
with respect to θ.
Lemma 3. p(1) is decreasing with respect to θ.



























Next we consider the situation when two production chains {xi} and
{x′i} are available and have identical prices for the final good, i.e. p{xi}(1) =
p{x′i}(1). We show that for a given increase in θ, the price for the chain
utilizing a greater number of firms decreases more than the one utilizing less
firms.



















, where {xi}ki=1 and {x′i}k
′
i=1 represent two pos-
sible production paths as explained in Lemma 2, with k′ > k, and xi ≥ x′i for
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Proof. The second inequality in (2.19) is shown in Lemma 3. The proof of





















































































































































where the second inequality is from the assumption that xi ≥ x′i for every
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2.3.1 Possible production paths for any network
This section and the next describes the computational solution to the model
which allows for a wide range of heterogeneity. The model can accommodate
heterogeneous θ, incomplete networks, or heterogeneous cost functions. It
can also be easily extended to an imperfect information setting.
The computational methodology is to calculate the price functions of
all the possible production paths in a network and pick the optimal one.
Hence, we first need to find all the combinatorial possibilities with which the
subcontracting process may take place. I have presented an analytical way
to calculate the number of possible paths in a complete network in Section
2.1.4, and in this section I will describe an algorithm which will calculate the
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paths for any kind of network.
To handle an incomplete network, or any generalized form of network,
Algorithm 1 is used to build a tree that maps out all the possible pathways.
The tree has the “Client node” at the root and initially branches off to each
of the firms in the network, each firm forms a “firm node”, which decides
how many parts of the good it should produce in-house. To represent this
decision, the tree branches at each firm node to all the possible choices of
the number of parts it can produce in-house. Each of these choices are
represented by a “task node”. Having chosen the number of parts to produce
in house, the production process can either come to an end, in which case
that current task node is a leaf of the tree, or it may be that the firm chose
to not producing everything in-house and instead subcontract some of the
production to another firm. In this case, the tree then branches at the task
node to the available subcontractors for that firm. These consist of the
firms which are: (i) connected to the current firm in the network, and (ii)
not already occupied in the production process further downstream. The
tree then branches to all these available firms, and the procedure recursively
begins again just like at the first level of firm nodes.
An example of the resulting production tree for a complete network of
n = 3 is shown in Figure 2.10. The circles show the firms, and the rectangles
show the portions of the good that each is producing. The 3 firms in the
network are numbered 0, 1, and 2.
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Algorithm 1: Building a production tree.
Data: Boolean matrix showing the n firms’ interconnections
Result: a production tree with n firms
1 set integer s = 0;
2 declare firmsUsed as an empty array;
3 if Algorithm is called at Client node then
4 for i← 0 to n− 1 do
5 build a child firm node and call it firm i;
6 call this algorithm recursively to firm i;
7 end
8 else if called at a firm node i then
9 insert self into firmsUsed array;
10 for t← 1 to s− 1 do
11 build a child firm node and call it task t;
12 call this algorithm recursively to task t;
13 end
14 else if called at a task node t then
15 s← s+ t ;
16 if s != n then
17 foreach firm i that is connected to parent firm node AND not
yet in the firmsUsed array do
18 build a child firm node and call it firm i;




2.3.2 Algorithm for computational solution
The computational solution simply traces the tree produced in Section 2.3.1
and illustrated in Figure 2.10, from the client located at the root of the tree
to each of the paths that lead to the leaves of the tree. Along the this path,
intermediate prices are calculated and firms in the intermediate stages of
the production process will eliminate the branches of the tree with higher
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Figure 2.10: Production tree for a complete network of n = 3.
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expected costs. As the result of this recursive elimination of branches, the
final path that is chosen by the client is the one with the lowest expected
expected cost at each stage in the production process. It is described in
Algorithms 2 and 3.
Algorithm 2: Solving for the optimal production path (Part 1).
Data:
The tree produced by Algorithm 1
The success probability θ
The cost function c(•)
Result:
The expected final price of the good p
The productionChain specifiying: (i) the firms involved in the
production process, (ii) the success or failure at each stage, (iii) the
number of parts produced by each firm, and (iv) the intermediate
prices
1 if Algorithm is called at Client node then
2 for j ← 0 to n− 1 do
3 call this algorithm recursively for firm j;
4 the algorithm will return: (i) pj, i.e. the expected cost for firm
j, and (ii) the productionChain that was used;
5 end
6 pick a firm jpick that offers the lowest pj, if several firms are tied,
select one at random;
7 return lowest pj, and productionChain;
8 continued in Algorithm 3...
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Algorithm 3: Solving for the optimal production path (Part 2).
Data: See Algorithm 2.
Result: See Algorithm 2.
9 else if called at a firm node i then
10 foreach task node t of firm node i do
11 calculate pinhouse, i.e. in house cost for producing fraction of
good defined by task node t;
12 pick a random boolean draw with probability θ to decide if the
subcontract was a success or failure;
13 if t is a leaf node then
14 declare a suitable data structure for the productionChain;
15 add self (firm i), outcome (success or failure), p, and
number of parts produced to the productionChain;
16 return pinhouse and productionChain;
17 else if t has children, which are firm nodes then
18 foreach children firm node j of task node t do
19 call this algorithm recursively for firm j;
20 the algorithm will return: (i) pj, i.e. the expected cost
for firm j, and (ii) the productionChain that was used;
21 end
22 pick a firm jpick that offers the lowest pj, if several firms are
tied, select one at random;
23 p← pinhouse + pjpick ;
24 add self (firm i), outcome (success or failure), p, and
number of parts produced to the productionChain of jpick;





This section presents the results obtained from solving the model computa-
tionally using the algorithms shown in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2. The solutions
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were computed for complete networks consisting of 2 to 7 firms. For each
network, θ was varied from 0.1 to 1.0, in increments of 0.01.
Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in Appendix A show respectively for networks of
n = 3, 5 and 7 firms how the production process is divided amongst the firms.
As θ increases, it can be seen that more firms are used in the subcontracting
process. Also, for every θ, the downstream firms are seen to produce larger
portions of the final good than the upstream firms. This result can also be
seen in Figures A.1 to A.6 in Appendix A, which show the number of firms
used in the production as theta varies from θ = 0.01 to 1.0 in increments
of 0.01. These results corroborate with those presented in Section 2.2 and
Kikuchi et al. (2012).
Tables A.4, A.5, and A.6 in Appendix A show respectively for networks of
n = 3, 5 and 7 firms how the value added varies amongst the firms. For every
θ, it can be seen that the value added by each firm increases as we go from
upstream to downstream firms. This result can also be seen in Figures A.7 to
A.12 in Appendix A, which show value added by each firm as a percentage of
the final price of the good, as theta varies from θ = 0.01 to 1.0 in increments
of 0.01. These results also corroborate with those presented in Section 2.2




This chapter presents the extended version of the model in which neither the
firms nor the client have objective knowledge of the probability of success θ
associated with one another. Instead, they learn about θ by observing the
successes and failures from the outcomes of previous subcontracts. This adds
a dynamic element to the model, where firms learn about the true value of θ
after multiple rounds of interaction.
When firms and the client update their beliefs about θ, they attribute a
different θ for each firm that they interact with and update each one sep-
arately. I use the notation θi→l to denote l’s belief about i’s probability of
success. Henceforth, I will refer to θi→l as i’s reputation to l.
As explained in Section 2.1.2, should a subcontracting process fail at a
certain point in the supply chain, losses are only incurred by a firm which
has failed in its in-house production of goods. Once a subcontractor A’s in-
house production fails, it will not obtain payment from it’s contractee, but
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it still has to pay its subcontractor which successfully delivered the interme-
diate goods. Thus, when we model the reputation updates as occurring for
a firm’s immediate subcontractor. For example, if the subcontracts go from
“client→ Firm A→ Firm B→ Firm C”, the client will only update A’s rep-
utation to it, A will only update B’s reputation to A, and B will only update
C’s reputation to B. Also, a contractee will only update a subcontractor’s
reputation if the subcontrator was the one responsible for the success or fail-
ure of the production. In other words, firms are not punished for the failures
of subcontractors who are further upstream. In the context of the example
above, where we have the path “client → Firm A → Firm B → Firm C”,
a failure by the most upstream firm, C, will not result in A punishing B by
lowering B’s reputation to A. The only update which takes place will be for
C’s reputation to B.
There are various assumptions we can make to justify this method of
updating reputations. One is to assume that a mechanism exists for verifying
who was at fault when a failure occurs.
Following the example above with the structure “client→ Firm A→ Firm
B→ Firm C”, following a failure by C to deliver goods to B, a subcontractor
B can point out to A that the failure was not caused during B’s in-house
production. We can assume that A can then verify that this is true. The
same goes for the A’s reputation to the client. Thus the A’s reputation to
the client remains intact and only B’s reputation to A also remains intact,
whereas C’s reputation to B is lowered.
In order to implement the reputation updating process, we modify the
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Algorithm 2 and 3 presented in 2.3.2 as shown in Algorithm 4 and 5. The
only changes being that the production takes place repeatedly over multiple
rounds as defined by the numRounds variable, and after the optimal path
has been chosen at the Client node, a round of reputation updates take place
depending on the success or failure of the subcontractors.
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Algorithm 4: Solving for the optimal production path with reputation
updates (Part 1).
Data:
The tree produced by Algorithm 1
The success probability θ
The cost function c(•)
Result:
The expected final price of the good p
The productionChain specifiying: (i) the firms involved in the
production process, (ii) the success or failure at each stage, (iii) the
number of parts produced by each firm, and (iv) the intermediate
prices
1 set int numRounds;
2 for r ← 0 to numRounds do
3 if Algorithm is called at Client node then
4 for j ← 0 to n− 1 do
5 call this algorithm recursively for firm j;
6 the algorithm will return: (i) pj, i.e. the expected cost for firm
j, and (ii) the productionChain that was used;
7 end
8 pick a firm jpick that offers the lowest pj, if several firms are tied,
select one at random;
9 foreach firm or Client j and its subcontractor firm k in
productionChain starting from most upstream k do
10 update θk→j, i.e. k’s reputation to j;
11 if k’s production failed then
12 exit “foreach” loop;
13 end
14 end
15 return lowest pj, and productionChain;
16 continued in Algorithm 5...
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Algorithm 5: Solving for the optimal production path with reputation
updates (Part 2).
Data: See Algorithm 4.
Result: See Algorithm 4.
17 else if called at a firm node i then
18 foreach task node t of firm node i do
19 calculate pinhouse, i.e. in house cost for producing fraction of
good defined by task node t;
20 pick a random boolean draw with probability θ to decide if the
subcontract was a success or failure;
21 if t is a leaf node then
22 declare a suitable data structure for the productionChain;
23 add self (firm i), outcome (success or failure), p, and
number of parts produced to the productionChain;
24 return pinhouse and productionChain;
25 else if t has children, which are firm nodes then
26 foreach children firm node j of task node t do
27 call this algorithm recursively for firm j;
28 the algorithm will return: (i) pj, i.e. the expected cost
for firm j, and (ii) the productionChain that was used;
29 end
30 pick a firm jpick that offers the lowest pj, if several firms are
tied, select one at random;
31 p← pinhouse + pjpick ;
32 add self (firm i), outcome (success or failure), p, and
number of parts produced to the productionChain of jpick;
33 update firm i’s reputation for firm jpick;




38 end main “for” loop
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3.1 Bayesian updating
The reputations are updated through a Bayesian updating process, in which
the client, as well as each firm, l, assigns a probability distribution of θi→l
to each potential subcontractor, i. This initial distribution is known as the
prior distribution pθi→l (θk) = P (θi→l = θk) over some set of values of θk. For
the purposes of this model, we use a discrete distribution of which allows
11 distinct values of θk = {0.0, 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 1.0}. Let µθk = P (θi→l = θk)
be the prior probability assigned by l that i’s reputation to l is θk. After
gathering evidence about firm i’s number of successes while working as a




= P (θi→l = θk|Si→l, Fi→l), where µ′θk is updated














which gives a new posterior distribution for pθi→l (θk).
For the purposes of this model, the initial prior distribution pθi→i (θk) is
assumed to be uniform over θk = {0.0, 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 1.0}.
Using this method for updating the θi→l values means that the firm i’s
expected profit maximization problem, which was formulated in Equation
2.1 becomes
E (pii) = E [θi→l] pi (si)− c (si − ui)− pj (ui) . (3.2)
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{c (si − ui(ki)) + pj (ui(ki))} , (3.3)
where E [θi→l] =
∑
θk
θkP (θi→l = θk|Si→l, Fi→l) is the contractee l’s expec-
tation of θi→l.
The next section discusses the circumstances in which E [θi→l] converges
to the true probability of success θ, that is actually homogeneous across every
firm in the network.
3.2 Results for extended model
In order to show that the Bayesian updating will result in the convergence
of E [θi→l] to θ after repeated interactions between the contractee l and the
subcontractor i, I present the results on a complete network of n = 5 firms
with a homogeneous θ = 0.8 across all firms. At this θ value, we know from
section 2.3.3, and Tables A.2 and A.5 that the optimal production process
involves utilizing all 5 firms, each producing 1
5
parts of the final good.
From the computational results, it is observed that all five firms are used
in the production, and that the value added by each firm converges to the
same result as in the baseline model. This is shown in Figure 3.1. It can be
seen that the values added converge to exactly those calculated in Table A.5.
The expected values for θi→l, however, only converge for some of the
“contractee-contractor” relationships. It is found that the sequence of sub-
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Figure 3.1: Convergence of value added by firms over 1000 rounds with
reputation updates in a complete network of n = 5 with θ = 0.8.
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contractors from the most upstream to the most downstream converge to
the same sequence of firms. In this particular example, the most upstream
is Firm #4, followed by #3, #2, #0, and finally #1 who occupies the most
downstream spot. As a consequence of the repeated interactions between
those particular pairs of firms, the expected values for θ4→3, θ3→2, θ2→0,
θ0→1, and θ1→Client converge to the true value θ = 0.8. This is shown in
Figure 3.2.
To look at the phenomenon in more detail, consider Figure 3.3, which
traces the prior distribution of θ0→1, i.e. pθ0→1 (θk) for each value of θk =
{0.0, 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 1.0}. The thickness of each band of color represents the
prior probability for each θk. It can be seen that after about 65 out of the
1000 rounds, θ0→1, i.e. pθ0→1 (θk = 0.8) = 1.0 whereas all the others are 0.
Contrast this with other values of θi→l for inter-firm relationships that are
not in the subcontracting path #4→ #3→ #2→ #0→ #1→ Client. For
example, Figure 3.4 shows how the distribution for θ2→1, which is not one of
the pairs which are continually updated, does not converge to the true value
of θ = 0.8. The figure shows only the first 100 rounds but the distribution
failed to converge even after 1000 rounds.
This selective convergence of θ values account for the main result of this
paper, namely that more interconnected networks are favoured over less in-
terconnected ones. The reason for this selective convergence is that in the
initial rounds of subcontracting, some firm may get a string of failures while
processing a subcontract and thus will result in contractee assigning a low
reputation for them. This in turn means that the expected costs associated
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Figure 3.2: Convergence of reputations for firms with repeated interactions
over 1000 rounds with reputation updates in a complete network of n = 5
with θ = 0.8.
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Figure 3.3: An example of the convergence of the prior distribution for firms
with repeated interactions. Recorded over 100 rounds with reputation up-
dates in a complete network of n = 5 with θ = 0.8. In this case, it is the
reputation of Firm #0 to Firm #1, θ0→1.
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Figure 3.4: An example of the non-convergence of the prior distribution for
firms without repeated interactions. Recorded over 100 rounds with reputa-
tion updates in a complete network of n = 5 with θ = 0.8. In this case, it is
the reputation of Firm #2 to Firm #1, θ2→1.
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with these low reputation firms are now higher than the expected costs as-
sociated with some other firms which might have gotten a string of initial
successes. This creates a path dependence in the updating process for θi→l.
When a network has more interconnections between the firms, an initial
string of failures by some of the firms does not necessarily raise expected
costs for all possible production paths. The more numerous interconnections
allow for other production paths to be used, which have not yet earned bad
reputations. To put in another way, each firm in a more interconnected
network has more potential firms to subcontract to, hence, if some of these
potential subcontractors have earned a bad reputation due to a string of fail-
ures, it can easily subcontract to the other potential subcontractors, whereas
in a less interconnected network, firms might be stuck with subcontractors
who have earned a bad reputation, hence incurring increased expected costs.
This ability of firms in a more interconnected networks to spread risk across
multiple potential subcontractors allows for a more interconnected network
to produce the good with a lower expected cost.
The result mentioned above is obtained via simulations on a network
shown in Figure 3.5. The actual success probability θ is set at 0.8 homoge-
nously across all the 10 firms. 100 simulations were run, with each simulation
lasting 1000 rounds. Towards the end of each simulation, the selective con-
vergence explained above causes a particular sequence of firms to be the
“dominant” contractors for every round. It is observed that for 72 out of the
100 simulations, the sequence of firms that became the dominant contrac-
tors were in the more interconnected network, while for 28 out of the 100
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Figure 3.5: Two networks with n = 5 firms each. The one on the left is
a complete network where each firm is connected to every other firm. The
one on the right is an incomplete network where each firm only has two
connections.
simulations, a sequence from the incomplete network became dominant. As
explained in Chapter 1, this phenomenon can be interpreted as a reason for
agglomeration economies.
3.3 Conclusion
I have presented a theoretical model of subcontracting among firms in a
network. In Chapter 2, it was shown that in a complete network setting with
complete information, certain analytical results can be obtained, as described
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in Section 2.2. A computational solution to the model was introduced in
Section 2.3, which could handle any network structure.
In Chapter 3, I extended the computational model to take into account a
dynamic Bayesian updating process for θ, which allows each of the firms to
learn the other firms’ θ from their past experiences. Simulation results show
that there is a path dependent effect in the updating of θ where firms that
initially obtain a string of successes become the dominant contractors. This
effect gives an advantage to networks in which firms are more interconnected,
suggesting a reason for agglomeration economies to take place.
For further research, analytical solutions to the extended model showing
the selective convergence would present a stronger case for the phenomenon.
Another change to the model might be to allow each firm at each stage of the
production process to not only subcontract to one other firm, but to multiple
firms at once. Empirical research linking reputation effects as a factor that
causes agglomeration would also give more validation to the model.
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Appendix A




Number of parts produced by each firm
0.1 1 3
0.2 2 2 1
0.3 2 2 1
0.4 2 2 1
0.5 2 2 1
0.6 3 1 1 1
0.7 3 1 1 1
0.8 3 1 1 1
0.9 3 1 1 1
1.0 3 1 1 1
Table A.1: Number of parts produced by each firm as θ varies for a complete
network with 3 firms.
θ Number of
firms used
Number of parts produced by each firm
0.1 1 5
0.2 2 4 1
0.3 2 4 1
0.4 3 3 1 1
0.5 3 3 1 1
0.6 4 2 1 1 1
0.7 4 2 1 1 1
0.8 5 1 1 1 1 1
0.9 5 1 1 1 1 1
1.0 5 1 1 1 1 1
Table A.2: Number of parts produced by each firm as θ varies for a complete




Number of parts produced by each firm
0.1 2 6 1
0.2 2 6 1
0.3 2 5 2
0.4 3 4 2 1
0.5 3 4 2 1
0.6 4 3 2 1 1
0.7 5 2 2 1 1 1
0.8 6 2 1 1 1 1 1
0.9 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1.0 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table A.3: Number of parts produced by each firm as θ varies for a complete
network with 7 firms.
θ Number of
firms used
Final price Value added by each firm
0.1 1 10 10
0.2 2 5 4.444 0.556
0.3 2 2.716 2.346 0.370
0.4 2 1.806 1.528 0.278
0.5 2 1.333 1.111 .0222
0.6 3 1.008 0.514 0.309 0.185
0.7 3 0.709 0.324 0.226 0.159
0.8 3 0.530 0.218 0.173 0.139
0.9 3 0.413 0.152 0.138 0.123
1.0 3 0.333 0.111 0.111 0.111
Table A.4: Number of parts produced by each firm as θ varies for a complete




Final price Value added by each firm
0.1 1 10 10
0.2 2 4.200 4.000 0.200
0.3 2 2.578 2.248 0.330
0.4 3 1.775 1.425 0.250 0.100
0.5 3 1.200 0.960 0.160 0.080
0.6 4 0.872 0.509 0.185 0.111 0.067
0.7 4 0.593 0.338 0.116 0.082 0.057
0.8 5 0.410 0.122 0.097 0.079 0.062 0.050
0.9 5 0.277 0.067 0.061 0.055 0.050 0.044
1.0 5 0.200 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040
Table A.5: Number of parts produced by each firm as θ varies for a complete
network with 5 firms.
θ Number of
firms used
Final price Value added by each firm
0.1 2 9.388 9.368 0.020
0.2 2 4.184 4.082 0.102
0.3 2 2.608 2.336 0.272
0.4 3 1.645 1.313 0.281 0.051
0.5 3 1.143 0.898 0.204 0.041
0.6 4 0.785 0.498 0.196 0.057 0.034
0.7 5 0.549 0.246 0.173 0.059 0.042 0.029
0.8 6 0.364 0.155 0.062 0.050 0.040 0.031 0.026
0.9 7 0.233 0.043 0.038 0.035 0.031 0.028 0.025 0.023
1.0 7 0.143 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.020 0.021 0.020
Table A.6: Number of parts produced by each firm as θ varies for a complete
network with 7 firms.
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Figure A.1: Graph showing number of parts produced by each firm varies as
a function of θ in a complete network with 2 firms.
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Figure A.2: Graph showing number of parts produced by each firm varies as
a function of θ in a complete network with 3 firms.
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Figure A.3: Graph showing number of parts produced by each firm varies as
a function of θ in a complete network with 4 firms.
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Figure A.4: Graph showing number of parts produced by each firm varies as
a function of θ in a complete network with 5 firms.
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Figure A.5: Graph showing number of parts produced by each firm varies as
a function of θ in a complete network with 6 firms.
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Figure A.6: Graph showing number of parts produced by each firm varies as
a function of θ in a complete network with 7 firms.
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Figure A.7: Graph showing value added by each firm varies as a function of
θ in a complete network with 2 firms.
84
Figure A.8: Graph showing value added by each firm varies as a function of
θ in a complete network with 3 firms.
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Figure A.9: Graph showing produced by each firm varies as a function of θ
in a complete network with 4 firms.
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Figure A.10: Graph showing produced by each firm varies as a function of θ
in a complete network with 5 firms.
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Figure A.11: Graph showing produced by each firm varies as a function of θ
in a complete network with 6 firms.
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Figure A.12: Graph showing produced by each firm varies as a function of θ
in a complete network with 7 firms.
